Democratic Governance and Economic Performance: How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business

Democratic Governance and Economic Performance: How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business

Democratic Governance and Economic Performance: How Accountability Can Go Too Far in Politics, Law, and Business
Publisher: Springer | pages: 168 | 2009 | ISBN: 0387787062 | PDF | 12,6 mb

Conventional wisdom warns that unaccountable political and business agents can enrich a few at the expense of many. But logically extending this wisdom implies that associated principals – voters, consumers, shareholders – will favor themselves over the greater good when ‘rules of the game’ instead create too much accountability. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance rigorously develops this hypothesis, and finds statistical evidence and case study illustrations that democratic institutions at various governance levels (e.g., federal, state, corporation) have facilitated opportunistic gains for electoral, consumer, and shareholder principals. To be sure, this conclusion does not dismiss the potential for democratic governance to productively reduce agency costs.

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